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Introduction

O

ver the course of the last three decades, Australia has committed forces to a

wide range of operations that have, collectively, involved the Australian

Defence Force (ADF) in its most sustained period of high operational tempo since

the Vietnam War. The operations include the first Gulf War, in 1990-9 1, and the
second Gulf War, in 2003 (both international armed conflicts (lACs)); belligerent
participation in non-international armed conflicts (NlACs) in Iraq post-l003 and
Afghanistan (at least since 2005); and participation in a range of peace operations
of widely varied political, ph ysical and legal risk, including transitional administra-

tions in Cambodia and East Timor, sanctions enforcement in the North Arabian
Gulf, and stabilization and mitigation operations in Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor,
Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. As each operation has unfolded, Australia
has learned (or in some cases, relearned) both practical and theoretical lessons
in operational law. In many cases, these lessons have been identified and
contextualized within a relatively defined (albeit fl uid) operational legal paradigm
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An Australian Perspective on Non-International Anned Conflict
in that experience with lAC, and non-law of armed conflict (LOA C)-governed
peace operations, has tended to be relatively linear and coherently incremental.
With NlACs, however, the trajectory has not always been as logical or smooth. I
believe that there are three reasons for this differing path. I shall not examine them
in any detail, but it is nevertheless useful to set them out up front for they provide a
contextual backdrop to the focus of this study. First, as opposed to lAC and peace
operations generally, there was-and remains-much less clarity about what law
applies in NIAC. Ongoing debates as to the application of human rights law in
armed conflict (which are almost universally conducted by reference to NlACbased examples)! and the lively and contentious discussion surrounding the application of lAC blockade law to what some characterize as a NlAC situation between
Israel and H amas in the Gaza Strip 2 are but two examples that illustrate this
point. 3 Indeed the fundamental task of distinguishing the N IAC threshold from its
" upper" and "lower" neighbor legal paradigms (lAC and less-than-NIAC law enforcement in situations of civil disturbance) similarly remains a highly contested
and politically laden debate. There is little doubt that the relative "scarcity" and
"opacity" of NlAC LOAC is one reason why NlAC LOAC is the primary battleground in the current push to harmonize lAC and NlAC LOAC by asserting that
most (if not all) ofthe lAC rules are equally applicable in NIAC, and to humanize
LOAC by reinterpreting its scope of application and the substance of many of its
constituent concepts in the light of human rights law. The result is that NlAC
LOAC is being squeezed between (or indeed, colonized by) its better defined and
more fully enwnerated paradigmatic neighbors, which in tum creates the perception-if not the actuality-of greater fluidity and indeterminacy than in other elements of operations law.
The second reason, which emanates from the first, is that the existence of a
NIAC remains a highly political assessment, whereas the existence of an lAC is generally (or at least relatively when compared to N IAC) easy to establish with a degree
of logic and certainty. This is most evident at the lower NIAC threshold, between
non-NlAC situations of civil disturbance and NlAC itself. The very large space for
political influence in a NIAC characterization decision (much larger than in the
equivalent lAC conflict characterization space) has meant that in addition to the
application ofNlAC LOAC being dogged by a higher degree of substantive uncertainty and opacity than either lAC LOAC or peace operations law, it has also remained a much more politically nuanced and contested body of law at even the
initial point of characterization. Perhaps the most striking illustration is the long
British reluctance to characterize "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland as anything
other than a less-than-NIAC law enforcement situation.4

294

Rob McLa ughlin
The third reason---certainly evident, in my view, in Australian practice, but
common across many partner operating States-is that when Australia has committed forces to lAC situations, it has almost universally been as a belligerent: Iraq/
Kuwait, 1990-91; Afghanistan, 2001; Iraq, 2003. However, when Australia has
committed forces into NlAC situations, it has almost universally been as a nonbelligerent stabilization or mitigation fo rce. There was dearly a NIAC under way in
Somalia in 1992, but Australia's force was not a party to it; rather, it was part of a
stabilization/mitigation mission and did not exercise the full suite ofLOAC powers
that would have been available to it, de jure, if it had been a party to the NlAC. Accordingly, the force was authorized to use lethal force in self-defense, but not to
conduct lethal targeting operations under the auspices of LOAC. 5 In Cambodia
and Rwanda it was similarly so. In East Timor, although there is debate as to
whether there was a NIAC (or even an lAC) afoot in 1999-2001, Australian forces
were not a party to any armed conflict and thus could not avail themselves of the
sharper end ofLOAC authorizations de jure. Thus, until Australia substantially reengaged in Afghanistan in 2005 as a belligerent party in what was by then clearly a
NlAC, Australia had to some extent been able to bypass the complexities of NIAC
LOAC. While the ADF often deployed into NIAC contexts, those forces were not
parties to the NIAC and operated under the "routine" peace operations legal
paradigm.

Aim
My aim in this short study is to ask how, from a legal perspective, Australia has approached the issue of"NlAC." I will seek to achieve this by examining four discrete
issues: conilict characterization, characterization of the opposing fo rce, rules of engagement (ROE) and treatment of captured/detained personnel. The methodology I have adopted is to examine each of these issues through a broadly
comparative prism-a comparison between a high-level non -NlAC operation
(East Timor, 1999-2001) and a NIAC operation (Afghanistan, ongoing since
2005). The purpose behind adopting this methodology is to provide a framework
for establishing an alternative against which NIAC practice can be compared. It
also provides a means of illustrating the degree to which this practice is either
consistent or different across the lower threshold ofNIAC, that is, between less-thanNlAC "peace" operations (law enforcement operations or stabilization/mitigation
operations), and NIAC operations themselves. The reasons Australia has taken different characterization paths, and the consequences of these choices, are, I believe,
central to understanding any "Australian approach to NIAC." My underlying
premise, as will quickly become evident, is that any legal understanding of NIAC
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and of the threshold between NlAC and less than NlAC is beholden to non-legal
influences to a much greater degree than in clear law enforcement or clear lAC
contexts.

Characterization of the Conflict: Afghanistan vs. East Timor
Characterization of the conflict situation is fundamental to Australia's approach to
almost every other element of operational authority. Although this issue is less significant for some other States, the choice to characterize a confli ct as a NIAC or as
"law enforcement," or to characterize Australian involvement in a NIAC as belligerency or as law enforcement or stabilization/mitigation partnership, results in a
vital use-of-forcecaveat for the ADF. This caveat is, in essence, that where Australia
is not a belligerent party to an armed conflict, Australian forces cannot (in general)
use lethal force in circumstances other than in individual and unit self-defense
(usually induding defense of others). Furthermore, use offorce where the Australian force is not a belligerent is governed entirely by the "routine" elements of Australian domestic criminallaw. 6 There is, consequently, no legally available option
for Australian forces to access any of the lethal LOAC authorizations when Australia is not a belligerent party to the NlAC. When Australia is a belligerent party to
the NIAC, and lethal force is used in alleged accordance with NIAC LOAC (for example, to target a fighter member of an organized armed group (OAG», then the
applicable law shifts, and brings into play Division 268 of the Commonwealth
Criminal Code (which domesticates the 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court offenses into Australian law).7
Afghanistan, at least since Australian forces re-engaged militarily in 2005, is a
NIAC and Australia is clearly a belligerent party to that NlAC. East Timor in 1999200 1 was, however, consciously characterized as a "law enforcement" or stabilization operation, even though the issue of characterization as a NIAC (or lAC) was
considered. What may have influenced these two legal/policy characterization decisions along very different paths? Certainly, the "facts on the ground" were not
radically different when rationalized against a relative scale. The Afghanistan context is current and well known and requires little recap; however, it is perhaps
worthwhile briefly reviewing, for comparative purposes, the less current East
Timor context. In relation to intensity, there were/are proportionally high casualty
rates in both conflict contexts. In East Timor, tens (by some counts hundreds) of
thousands had died under Indonesian occupation, and the consequent insurgency,
since 1975. 8At the point of intervention in 1999, there were wide-scale destruction
of infrastructure and massive displacement of the population. On Septem ber 20,
1999, as the United Nations Security Council-sanctioned International Force East
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Timor (INTERFET) commenced deployment, few buildings in Dili were undamaged and all but three of East Timor's main population centers had been either
completely destroyed (two towns) or 70 percent burnt down or leveled (four
townS).9 Population displacement was on a massive scale: as recorded subsequently
in an ADF "lessons learnt" study: "A preliminary UN inter-agency assessment of
the situation issued on 27 September 1999 estimated that of a total pre-ballot population of890,000, over 500,000 had been displaced by violence, including 150,000
to West Timor [Indonesian territory]."iO
In terms of organization, in East Timor there were legacy militias and insurgency groupings (which had been fighting Indonesian occupation since 1975), as
well as newer militias of both pro-integrationist and independence sympathies.
The political context was complicated by external actors (such as Portugal (the former colonial power), Australia, Indonesia and the UN) and militia sponsors (including, it now seems well established, elements within the Indonesian military) .
The comparison with Afghanistan's political and conflict situation (complicated
by the engagement of Pakistan, United States, NATO, UN, and warlord, trans-border
militia, and transnational terrorist group interests) is-when scaled-readily evident. The situation in East Timor 1999-2001 could arguably be said to have met
both the Tadii "intensity of the conflict and organization of the parties to the confli ct" e1ementsll as readily as the situation in Afghanistan currently does.
However, despite such contextual similarities in terms of the "facts on the
ground" of which LOAC takes cognizance, the strategic contexts in which the East
Timor and Afghanistan conflict characterization decisions were made were radically different. This clearly played into the fundamentally different characterization decisions Australia arrived at in relation to these two conflict contexts. In
Afghanistan, the "other" was the unloved Taliban and its widely detested partner
AI Qaeda-both routinely described through militarized rhetoric emphasizing organization, capacity, universal aims, threat level and reach. As Australia's then
Prime Minister, John Howard, said of the attacks of September 11,2001 and those
who sponsored and sheltered the perpetrators:
[IJt is the product of evil minds and it is the product of an attitude of a group of people
who in every sense [eJvoke those very evocative words of Winston Churchill when he
said that those responsible for the Nazi occupation of Europe should be regarded in
their brutish hour of triumph as the moral outcasts of mankind. 12

In announcing the deployment of forces to Afghanistan, Prime Minister
Howard was explicit as to the readily condemnable nature of the "other": "Well we
certainly don't have any concern about being involved in action against those
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people who were responsible for the terrorist attack."13 Indeed, Australia had by
this stage invoked the ANZUS Treaty,14 indicating that the Afghanistan conflict
context had been informed by a significant legal act which was more armed conflict
focused than not. IS This militarized (as opposed to law enforcement terminology
based) characterization of the conflict remains the case. As Minister for Defence
Stephen Smith observed in March 20 11 , "[ olur fundamental goal is to prevent Afghanistan from again being used by terrorists to plan and train for attacks on innocent civilians, including Australians in our own region and beyond."16
Th us in relation to Afghanistan, defming the context as a NIAC and engaging as
a belligerent within it heralded few prospects of causing a damaging rift with an important neighbor or influential member of the international community, or of
subscribing to a highly legally contested or politically risky characterization of the
"other." In many ways, there was little political or strategic risk to balance against
the political and strategic gain of characterizing the situation as a NlAC and of Australian engagement within it being as a belligerent party.
But the strategic context in which the East Timor conflict characterization decision was made was very different indeed. Certain1y, if one looks only to the "facts
on the ground" there had been a NlAC (or lAO) during the period oflndonesian
occupation. It may even have been an Additional Protocoll Article 1(4) conflict. I?
But for Australia, this was a difficult issue: Australia was one of the few States that
had recognized the Indonesian annexation. III Even when the conflict morphed in
1999-2001 into something like a NIAC with integrationist militia as the "other,"
the conflict characterization settled upon appears to have been that there was no
NlAC afoot. During INTERFET (an Australian-commanded "green helmet"
force ), Australia certainly had greater "national" scope to characterize the conflict
as a NlAC than in the later UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTA£T) "blue helmet" period, but chose not to do so. This decision was maintained even as INTERFET deployed ashore in DiU, where the pro-integrationist
militias were burning, looting, killing and terrorizing, and were doing so with the
tacit support, if not backing, of some members of the Indonesian military.l9
These militias were certainly potentially characterizable as an organized armed
group in a NlAC context if we apply our Afghanistan -based conception of "organized armed group." But in 1999, the recent (and ongoing) "civilians taking a direct part in hostilities" debate was in the future; thus the assessment was made
against the slim-and relatively unnuanced-black letter law criteria recognizable
in Additional Protocol I, Additional ProtocollI 20 and Common Article 3 to the
1949 Geneva Conventions,2l and their associated commentaries.
But there were also other vital factors that militated against such characterization. The first was the fact that INTERFET was present in East Timor partly on the
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basis of an Indonesian invitation .22 The second was that security was envisaged to
be a combined INTERFETllndonesian responsibility during the transition phase,
thus requiring INTERFET to cooperate with Indonesian forces until they withdrew (although in reality this did not turn out to be a long phase, as Indonesian
forces rapidly departed). Finally, regardless of whet her there was a NIACafoot, the
Security Council and Australia (as the lead troop-contributing nation (TCN) for
INTERFET, and also furnishing its commander) consciously determined that the
UN-sanctioned force was not involved in a NlAC. This was not a universal view.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had indicated to Australia
that "militia members detained for acts of violence against INTERFET members
were entitled to prisoner of war status. The ICRe's reasoning was that ifit were accepted that the militia were at least controlled by the Indonesian armed forces then
dashes between militia and INTERFET would constitute armed conflict."23
The Australian view was that LOAC did not apply de jure, and the situation was
one oflaw enforcement/stabilization. Thus even if the Fourth Geneva Convention
(GC IV)24 was used as a template for managing the situation, this was clearly contemplated as resting upon a policy basis, for quite apart from whether the situation
was even an armed conflict at all, GC IV of course applies de jure to lACs, not
NIACs. However, one revealing element in this decision-making process is instructive as to the sorts of concerns that can inform conflict characterization decisions at the lower threshold (that is, NlAC, or less-than-NlAC law enforcementl
stabilization) in that the issue of reciprocity was dearly in mind. For some of those
analyzing the context there was certainly a concern that if Australia fo und that GC
IV applied de jure, it may "have the legal consequence either of rendering ADF
personnel 'lawful' targets, making Australia party to any conflict, or bringing into
effect the other Geneva Conventions of 1949."25 Ultimately, the settled view taken
was that
the Convention [GC IV] would not make Australian troops a party to a conflict who
could then be targeted "as of right by other parties to the conflict . ... " If the Fourth
Conve ntion applied and armed elements attacked Australian troops this would be
illegal unless it was part of an organised armed force with a responsible command
structure. 26

Clearly. the reciprocity issue-that is, if the East Timor context had been characterized as a NIAC (or lAC) it would have raised the specter of the UN-sanctioned
force being subject to legitimate LOAC targeting-was an overt concern, and thus
a factor which played into the confli ct characterization decision with respect to
East Timor.
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Characterization of the Opposing Force
In many ways, the "legal" characterization given to the "other" (the adversary) in a
conflict situation (be it NIAC or less than NIAC) necessarily follows from the
broader conflict characterization decision. However, it is nevertheless worth observing that-arguably, in Australian experience at least-the legal characterization accorded this "other" has two major implications for operations. The first is
defining the line in NlAC between targetable fighter activity and merely criminal
activity, given that all violent action by an OAG in a NIAC is fundamentally
characterizable as criminal activity ab initio. This is an issue that does not arise
when the overall conflict characterization is less-than-NlAC status, thus requiring
that all "militia" or "armed gang" violence be met with a law enforcement, as opposed to a LOAC-based, response. The second implication concerns the rhetorical
treatment of the "other. " This factor, while not strictly legal, requires brief examination as it appears to reflect a fundamentally politicaUlegal appreciation of the situation, as opposed to one based purely in "the facts on the ground."
Organized Armed Groups in Non-International Armed Conflict
This study is not the venue for revisiting the battlelines in the ongoing debate on
direct participation in hostilities and the ICRe's itlterpretive Guidance.27 It is sufficient for our purposes to simply recall that the argument is, in essence, about what
activity and which actors are within the targetable envelope (in the LOAC sense of
authorization to proactively seek out and kill without having to limit lethal force to
situations of self-defense), and what and who are outside that envelope for LOAC
purposes. It is therefore sufficient to simply note that a fundamental point of
divergence centers around what constitutes an OAG, and, more importantly,
what activity/which actors associated with that OAG are targetable in the LOAC
sense. The directly relevant question, however, is whether this heralds any significant operational implications.
In Afghanistan, where Australia considers itself to be a belligerent party to a
NIAC, the main "other" is defined in terms of an OAG. This characterization, however, is not a simple matter, and as is the case for many States engaged in Afghanistan (and previously Iraq), this concept ofOAG has actually evolved as an applied
operational and ROE concept in tandem with its evolution as a legal concept. As a
consequence, there was a period of working through and settling the parameters of
the concept in terms ofTCN law and policy at the very time it was also being used
to support lethal effects in the field. This evolution of a critical legal and operational concept for NlAC, through the crucible of current operations, has not been
without problems. The foremost of these has been that while Australia has been
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working out what it means when it refers to an OAG, other States have also been
doing this and conclusions do differ.
Two examples may serve to illustrate this conundrum. The first is the furor that
erupted within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) over "targeting
drug barons," a debate that is readily traced through the newspapers of many ISAF
TCNs. As the New York Times reported:
United States military commanders have told Congress that they are convinced that
the policy is legal under the military's rules of engagement and international law. They
also said the move is an essential part of their new plan to disrupt the flow of drug
money that is helping finance the Taliban insurgency....
The Senate report's disclosure of a hit list for drug traffickers may lead to criticism in
the United States over the expansion of the military's m ission, and NATO allies have
al ready raised questions about the strategy of killing individuals who are not traditional
military targets. 28

This policy shift caused significant concern among a number of ISAF partner
TCNs. As reported in the UK newspaper The Guardian,
Previous missions have been held up by Nato lawyers arguing over whethe r an operation was primarily a counter-narcotics/policing m ission or a counter-terrorism!
military mission. European allies have strongly resisted the push to usingmilitaryassets
for counter-narcotics missions.
The new American policy is the outcome of heated debates between the US and many
of its European allies in Afghanistan who have long viewed the country's booming
narcotics industry as a policing problem, not a military one.29

The Canadian view, expressing the compromise that ultimately appears to have
been reached in the policy debate, was reported to be as follows:
Some commanders opposed targeting the drug trade because it is against international
law to use military force against civilian targets.--even if they are criminals.
NATO senetarygeneral Jaap de [Hoop) Scheffer says the debate is over and there is full
agreement within the alliance to go after Afghanistan's illegal drug industry.
Mr MacKay says Canadian troops will attack drug lords and opium traffickers where
there is proof of a direct link to the Taliban insurgency.X1
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This formulation of the test as being "proof of a direct link to the Taliban insurgency" still allowed for different national interpretations as to what "legal approach" would be utilized by each individual TCN (law enforcement or LOACbased targeting). It also explicitly recognized that individual TCNs will employ a
variety of criteria (on occasion inconsistent as between those TCNs) for establishing the nexus required to bring drug trafficking (a criminal activity) within the
OAG targetable envelope (a LOAC concern ). This is generally achieved, it appears,
via the legal paths of personal linkages to fighter OAG roles, or the adequacy and
directness of the linkage between financing activities and fighting activities. The
Canadian formulation of the legal position is thus indicative of the routine need to
utilize a degree of constructive ambiguity when publicizing the resolution to contentious legalJpolicy debates in the context of multinational operations-that is,
the words used to explain the resolution must still permit of individual TCN interpretive wriggle room.
The second example relates to the attachment of military members from one
TCN to units from another TCN, where those two States may adopt slightly different views on what and who is within-and without-the OAG targetable envelope.
For example, when Australia sent Gunners to join a UK artillery regiment on deployment to Afghanistan,ll it was vital that Australia and the United Kingdom
looked very closely at each other's concept ofOAG. The legal risk inherent in any
such attachment, while remote, is nevertheless present. If, for example, the attached (fully briefed) Australian Gunners under UK command engaged a target
who was within the targetable OAG envelope under the UK approach (and thus a
completely legitimate target for the UK), but outside the targetable OAG envelope
under the Australian approach (and thus perhaps not a legitimate military target
under the Australian interpretation), then the Gunners may have opened the door
to claims that they stood in legal danger under Australian law. Such risks are often
easily mitigated through briefings, caveats, and operational command and control
arrangements, but when the risk is linked to a fluid and highly contested legal concept-such as the legitimate envelope of targetable activities and members within
OAGs in NIAC-risk mitigation becomes significantly more difficult. In such a
case, the first step is to identify the very possibility of different interpretations. The
next step is to identify whether those interpretive differences actually herald any
substantive differences in what/who may be targeted. For the sake of a clear appreciation of potential TCN domestic legal consequences, this step in operational legal
risk management should never be glossed over.
In Afghanistan, the characterization ofthe "other" as an OAG in the LOAC sense
is intimately reflected in the rhetoric employed to describe that "other." The Taliban!
AI Qaeda adversary is described as a determined, capable, organized military foe,
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and the campaign as punctuated by "fighting seasons." In March 2011, the Australian Minister for Defence, for example, indicated that
[tJhere are signs that the international community's recent troop surge, combined now
with a strong military and political strategy, has reversed the Taliban's momentum.
This progress is incremental and hard-won, but it is apparent.. .
But I do urge caution. United States Defense Intelligence Agency head, General Ron
Burgess. has cautioned that "the security situation remains fragile and heavily dependent
on ISAF support" and that the Taliban "remains resilient and will be able to threaten
US and international goals in Afghanistan through 2011 ."
We must expect pushback from the Taliban, particularly in areas recently claimed by
ISAF and Afghan troops, when this year's fighting season commences in April or May.
We do need to steel ourselves for a tough fighting season.32
The rhetoric and concepts associated with a military, as opposed to merely criminal,
adversary are well evident: planning, campaigns, the holding of territory, the high
level of security threat, coo rdination, political purpose and so on. In this way,
the political/legal rheto ric used to describe the "other" is clearly and fu ndamentally beholden to the earlie r decisio ns to characterize the conflict as a
N IAC, to characterize Australia's involvement in that N IAC as that of a belliger ent party and to consequen tly describe the "other"-the adversary in the
N IAC-in terms of an OAG.
"Criminal Gangs" in Less-Than-NIAC Sit ua tio ns
In East Timor, the decision to operate in a "law enforcement" mode, and to avoid
characterizing the conflict as a NlAC (or, if a NIAC was afoot, then to characterize
Australia as a non-party to it) predetermined the characterization decision as to the
"other." As there was no NIAC for INTERFET, there was no targetable "other" in
the LOAC sense. Thus the "other" was legally characterizable as a simple criminal,
with none of the complications inherent in the LOACconcept ofOAG at play. This
simplifies the legal regime applicable to dealing with this "other" in that because
they are mere criminals, and there is no scope for the application of LOAC
targeting authorizations, each criminal and each act of cr iminal violence can only
be dealt with in the law enforcement context of detention, arrest, search and seizure,
and use of lethal force only in self-defense. This political!1egal decision as to confli ct characterizatio n, and its consequent characterization of the "other," thus requires that this ad versary is described in terms of criminality, that is, not in de facto
military terms. During the height of the crisis in East Tim or, for example, one
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member of the Australian Parliament indicated that "we know what has happened,
according to newspaper reports, because of the open communications that took
place between elements of the Indonesian military and some of their militia thugs
in EastTimor."n Similarly, the then Australian Foreign Minister was adamant that
"[ t lhe United Nations, Australia and the international community as a whole will
not, of course, be bullied by thugs. We will not be bullied out of this United Nations process and we will not be bullied into abandoning the United Nations supervised ballot in East Timor.":J.I
He went on to afftrm that
I think it is fair to say that the international community, on balance, thought that the
situation would be pretty bad after the an nouncement of the result, but I do not think
the international community quite expected-and Kofi Annan has made this point in
the last week or tw()----the rampant destruction that took place during that period I do
not think the international community, in the end, concluded that people could ever
behave that badly.3s

He continued, " [W le hope in any case, with the insertion of the multinational force
and with the move towards the United Nations taking over control of East Timor,
that we will see the rather rapid dissolution of the militias."36
The rhetoric of " pure" criminality-thuggery, bad behavior, transience, private
ends, lack of coordination, cowardice in the face of a concerted police and military
response-is clearly evident, as is the complete absence of any militarized rhetoric
in describing this adversary.

Rules of Engagement Issues
The fact that East Timor was characterized as a less-than-NlAC law enforcement
and stabilization context, whereas Afghanistan is a NlAC, obviously held significant consequences for ROE. Each characterization decision, however, brings with
it a series of unique complications that must be reflected in ROE.

For Afghanistan, ROE are clearly LOAC based and authorize the proactive targeting of certain individuals with lethal force, not being limited to self-defense. This is
complicated, however, by the fact that LOAC lends itself to a broad range of interpretive differences between States-much more so than the core legal elements of
less- than -NIAC law enforcement and stabilization/mitigation operations. It also
necessitates that a whole range ofLOAC rules that are applicable only on a patchwork basis (such as those relating to anti-personnel land mines, cluster munitions,
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riot control agents, explosive remnants of war, etc.) need to be managed and deconflicted among multiple operational partners. In law enforcement-based operations, most of these LOAC elements are not applicable de jure; thus the complexity
of managing this patchwork of obligations is to some degree mitigated.
A brief examination of four peculiarly NIAC-related ROE issues that Australia
has faced in this context may selVe to illustrate this situation. First, as noted
previously, the issue of applying-th rough ROE---concurrently evolving law
with respect to determining (as a national legal position) who is within and who is
outside the OAG targetable envelope is problematic. This holds direct implications-and potential criminal consequences-for each TCN's forces when conducting combined operations, or while on attachments with units from other
TCNs-such as the Australian Gunners deployed with UK artillery regiments or
Australian staff officers deployed into U.S.-commanded/controlled combined air
operations centersF
Second, one complication of the fact that Australia has characterized the conflict
in Afghanistan as a NlAC and Australia as a belligerent party to that NlAC is that
Australian ROE had to be drafted with a dose eye on the equivalent belligerencybased NATO ROE. This creates a need to explain, "nationalize" and de-conflict
some critical items of terminology. One of the more significant is that NATO ROE
use the concepts of "hostile act" and "hostile intent" in a radically different way
from Australian ROE doctrine and practice. In NATO ROE doctrine, these concepts can be used as components of LOAC-based attackrules,38 for example, tocreate ROE that require restraint from attack (in situations where, u nder LOAC,
attack would be lawful) unless the adversary force demonstrates hostile intent toward an own-force element (such as positioning to attack it) or carries out a hostile
act against an own-force element (such as attacking it). An example of this form of
NATO usage is rule of engagement 421. That rule states: "Attack against any forces
or any targets demonstrating hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack)
against NATO forces is authorised. "39
In Australian ROE doctrine and practice, the concepts of hostile act and hostile
intent are generally employed in relation to individual and unit self-defense as
ROE shorthand for the domestic criminal law requirements of necessity, imminence and reasonableness of use of force in individual self-defense. This is also the
manner in which these two concepts are utilized in the International Institute of
Humanitarian Law's Rules of Engagement Handbook. 40
The third example of an ROE implication of a NIAC conflict characterization
dedsion is that Australia must apply a whole range of more stringent rules and processes to many enabling capabilities. In NIAC, it really matters what, precisely, the
civilian contractor operator of an unmanned aerial vehicle is doing. Certain
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actions will not place that civilian in the position of becoming a direct participant
in hostilities (and thus subject to the temporary or longer-term loss of the civilian
protections that attend this change in "status"), whereas certain other acts will do
so. In law enforcementlstabilization operations, it does not matter nearly so much
who the operator is; the operator's status is incontrovertibly not that of a direct
participant in hostilities because there are, in a LOAC sense, no hostilities in which
to participate.
Finally, one very interesting ROE issue which has emerged in some civilian
casualty incident inquiry reports that Australia and many other TCNs publicly
release from time to time is the very fluidity and uncertainty that often surround
the status characterization of the person killed. This has meant that assertions of
justification are often two-pronged. When explaining a use of lethal force in a
NlAC context, it is not unusual for military personnel to report it as a consequence
of self-defense and the result of a reasonably held belief-in the circumstances prevailing at the time-that the "target" was a fighter member of an OAG . This paradigm mixing is not merely an Australian legal oddity. As Constantin von der
Groben observed in relation to the German prosecutor's investigation into the
Kunduz tanker incident in Afghanistan in 2009 (a scenario involving uncertainty
as to the precise legal paradigm against which to assess the conduct),
[tlhe ambiguity in the facts follows an ambiguity in the applicable laws. The problem
with the airstrike is that it was undear whether it had been performed as part of a noninternational armed conflict in Afghanistan or just as part of a stabilization mission
below the threshold of "armed conflict.»<I1

The consequence was that until the prosecutor settled the issue, there was uncertainty as to whether the deaths inflicted stood to be assessed against general German criminal law (self-defense) or separate LOAC-based German criminal law
(targeting). Similarly, the U.S. government-as a consequence of the initially confused manner in which the Osama bin Laden "killIcapture" mission was presented
to the public':L-has also faced this "killing a legitimate target" versus "killed in
self-defense when he moved to attack one of those sent to arrest him" justificatory
conundrum. This difficulty in paradigmatic justification rarely arises in the context
of lAC (other than in situations of occupation), where the reason cited for killing
those in enemy uniform is generally precisely that they were targetable enemy combatants, and thus legitimate targets under LOAC. Self-defense does not generally
arise in terms of primary legal justifications, even though, of course, it is routine
that military personnel of each party to the lAC will kill those of the adversary at a
time when both are engaged in what their own domestic law would recognize as an
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in extremis situation where self-defense was naturally available as a justification or
excuse. Nor does this dualist justification present as necessary (or indeed legally
possible) in less-than-NIAC law enforcement contexts, where status is irrelevant
because all are "civilians"; thus, the available justification for use of lethal force is
self-defense and LOAC-based targeting authorizations are not legally available.
One example of this paradigm mixing may be found in a publicly released ADF
Inquiry Officer Report, "Possible Civilian Casualties Resulting from Clearance of a
Compound at [Redacted], Afghanistan, on 2 Apr 09."43 In this report, the inquiry
officer determined that the Australian force element entered a compound where
an insurgent leader was identified as being present and in the clearance process
shot and killed a number of men whom they believed to be in firing positions and
to be directly participating in hostilities. But the precise explanation for each death
is said to be "self-defense," although this is buttressed with assertions of belief as to
thedirect-participation -in-hostilitiesstatusofthose killed. In my view, this isa potentially substantive legal issue precisely because Australian criminal law requires
different standards of assessment for killings in self-defense, as distinct from killings in the context of NIAC of civilians taking a direct part in hostilities and/or
fighter mem bers of an OAG. Under LOAC, it is dear that "defense" against an
"attack" is bound by the same LOAC rules as attack. 44 This logically means, for example, that a soldier cannot use CS gas "in self-defense" against an attack by fighter
members of the adversary OAG, as use of such riot control agents against the LOACtargetable enemy would likely breach Article 1(5) of the Chemical Weapons Convention.45 It would also mean that the death, injury and destruction caused in the
"defensive" action would be assessable against the unique and highly contextual
LOAC conception of proportionality.46 But "self-defense" in Australian criminal
law"'7 is not bound by the same limitations or assessment criteria. There is no legal
prohibition on use of a chemical spray (Mace, for example) in self-defense and
LOAC " proportionality" is not the same as the criminal law self- defense requirements expressed in elements such as "reasonableness," "imminence" and "necessity." In my own view, the concept of a "TIC" (troops in contact) action against
civilians taking a direct part in hostilities/OAG fighters in NlAC contexts has complicated this issue by perhaps inadvertently dressing what is fundamentally a
LOAC situation of attack and response in the legal rhetoric of urgent self-defense. I
do believe that this is a sleeper problem with potentially serious legal consequences
that may be deleterious for operational confidence if a claim of "self-defense" (as
opposed toa LOAC justification) is tested in a domestic court that may take littleor worse, incorrect but precedent setting--cognizance of the armed conflict context
and the alternative assessment criteria that LOAC provides.
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Less-Than-NIAC ROE-East Timor
In East Timor, the decision to characterize the conflict as a less-than-N IAC lawenforcement/stabilization operation created a different set of ROE issues. The firs t,
and most significant, was the manner by which ROE delineate use-of-force options
as between self-defense (where lethal force is permitted) and, separately, mission
accomplishment (where, for Australia at any rate, lethal force is not permitted).
Working through this issue via the mechanism of ROE is important, but not simple. INTERFET ROE contained a rule apparent1y authorizing use of force, including lethal force, for mission accomplishment. In NIAC contexts, such a rule is, of
course, the nonn, as it lays the general authorization for use oflethal force outside
self-defense, allowing further rules to then detail when and how this lethal force
may be employed-targeting, status and identification rules, for example. But in
less-than-NIAC law enforcement operations, Australian criminal law does not
generally countenance use oflethal force other than in self-defense, which was the
subject of a separate series of rules in the UNTAET ROE. In faa, the Australian
commander of INTERFET actually restricted use of lethal force to situations of
self-defense only, thus, in effect, reading down the mission accomplishment rule. 48
In my view, it was both operationally sound and legally necessary to read the
INTERFET mission accomplishment rule down in this manner.
The second ROE issue in this context-one which is not an issue where the
conflict is characterized as a NIAC-is lingering uncertainty as to what, precisely,
is permissible in terms of use of lethal force when a United Nations Security
Council Chapter VII "all necessary means" authorization is to be applied in a lessthan-NlAC context. That is, does this authorization provide a non-LOAC-based
permission to use lethal force for mission accomplishment where there is no issue
of self- defense in play? This is a highly complicated question that can only be analyzed through an ecumenical approach taking both international and specific
TeN domestic law into account. In myview-and I will readily admit it is a con tested view-there is no recognition in Australian law (nor in international law,
I would also submit) of a "third" paradigm permitting use of lethal force in pursuance of a Security Council mandate, outside of self-defense, in the absence of
armed conflict. That is, regardless of a Chapter VII "all necessary means" authorization, if the conflict has not been characterized as an armed conflict, then there
is no authority to use lethal force for any reason outside self-defense. 49 Therefore,
it is not possible to justify an ROE permitting use of lethal force in (non-self-defense
based) mission accomplishment situations on the basis of an "all necessary means"
authorization.
In East Timor, upon transition to UNTAET and UN ROE, this situation became
even more opaque. The April 28, 2000 UN ROE stated that "UNTAET military
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personnel are required to comply with International Law, including the Law of
Armed Conflict ... and to apply the ROE in accordance with those laws. "SO The
ROE then detailed "Level of Force" rules that permitted use of lethal force in selfdefense, but also in a series of what would otherwise be better understood as mission accomplishment-based actions. These rules included authorizations to use
lethal fo rce against any party who limited or intended to limit UNT AET freedom
of movement, and against any armed party that attempted to prevent UNTAET
personnel from discharging their duty.sl The issue of what, precisely, the UN
means when it says "self-defense" in the context of UN operations, and, indeed,
whether "self-defense of the mandate" is self-defense as understood in many domestic legal systems at all, is, I believe, a well obfuscated and often avoided operational question. 52 However, given the Australian characterization of the context as
less-than-NIAC law enforcem ent, any mission accomplishment ROE that allowed
use oflethal force outside of self-defense had to be assessed against the standard of
general Australian criminal law (as that is the standard against which a soldier who
used lethal force would be assessed), not the Australian domestication of LOAC
into Australian law. Thus these rules-although they were UN ROE---could not, as
a matter of Australian law, be applied by Australian forces as drafted, although it is
eq ually clear that other TCNs could apply these rules to their fullest extent and still
remain in compliance with their own domestic law.
This general issue discloses a third ROE challenge inherent in deciding to adopt
a less-than-NIAC law enforcement characterization-force protection. In the East
Timor context, this conundrwn cam e to the fore when militia elements recommenced cross-border raiding activity, killed a number of VNTAET Peacekeeping
Force (PKF) members and retreated back into West Timor (Indonesian territory)
for sanctuary. To deal with this, the ROE were amended to provide an "expanded"
definition of hostile act/hostile intent which provided that militia identified as
being armed and moving in a tactical manner could in certain situations be engaged with lethal force "in self-defense." The ROE achieved this by determining
that the PKF could legitimately characterize such conduct as constituting an imminent threat. $3
The ROE issue that arises, however, is that the consciously considered decision
to characterize a conflict situation as less-than-NIAC law enforcement when a
NlAC characterization possibility exists carries with it some legal risk. This results
when the bounds of self-defense-as the only available lawful justification for use
of lethal force-have to be stretched within the law enforcement paradigm to alIowan adequate response to a developing threat.
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Treatment of CapturedlDetained Personnel
In many respects. despite the highly political and strategically sensitive nature of
detainee issues in military operations. for Australia this field of endeavor actually
discloses very little difference between implementation in NlAC and that in lessthan-NlAC law enforcement/stabilization operations. This admittedly contentious
assertion can be illustrated via a brief examination of the fundam ental principlesdistilled from public statemen ts an d experience. and uncluttered by contextspecific legal terminology-applied in detainee operations in East Timor and
Afghanistan.
In East Timor. where the structures. institutions. and agents of law and order
had entirely dissolved. they had to be rebuilt from scratch. first on an interim basis
by INTERFET. and then on a more enduring basis by UNTAET. prior to full East
Timorese independence in May 2002. To cover the gap. Australia established a
Detainee Management Unit (DMU). which comprised an independent military
judge. counsel for detainees. a prosecutor and a detention visitor who maintained
an independent check on detention processes and conditions.54 The DMU was
mandated to review ongoing detention. not to try offenses. The ultimate aim was
simply to ensure that only those against whom there was a reasonable case offu ture
prosecution for a serio us offense (under the transitional justice system then being
reconstructed) remained in detention. The fundamental principles governing detention arrangements during INTERFET are arguably distillable as follows:
1. Ensuring a process that allowed for quick initial removal fro m the streets
of people posing security/stability risks.
2. Ensuring protection of the relevant human rights fo r detainees.
3. Using local criminal o r security law as the reason/basis for detention.
both as a recognition of the primary sovereignty at play within the territory. and as a means of developing and promoting capacity within that
sovereignty.
4. Using analogous elements of LOAC. o n a policy as opposed to de jure
basis. to inform detention operations.
5. Having in place system s of guarantees for fundamental human rights as
to treatment and legal processes post-handover into the developing East
Timor criminal justice system .
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In Afghanistan, when Australia redeployed to Uruzgan Province as a partner
with Dutch forces, the detainee management arrangements reflected the fact that
Australia had negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the
Dutch government, under which Dutch forces took full responsibility for the
detention and handover of all Australian -apprehended detainees. The Dutch had
separately negotiated an MOU with the government of Afghanistan that addressed handover and ongoing monitoring arrangements for all detainees (including Australian- "sourced" detainees) who were handed over to Afghan
authorities in line with ISAP arrangements with the government of Afghanistan.
On August 1,2010, as the Dutch force redeployed out ofUruzgan, Australia took
full responsibility for its detainees, and, as a consequence, negotiated MOUs with
Afghanistan and the United States on handover and monitoring arrangements. 55
Despite the vel)' different conflict context-a NIAC in which Australia is a belligerent party-there is arguably little substantial difference between the fundamental principles governing the Australian approach to detention operations in East
Timor under INTERFET and UNTAET, and those governing detention operations in Afghanistan. That is, regardless of the context and the legal paraphernalia
that attends it-be it NIAC or less-than -NIAC conflict-the fundamental principles governing detention operations are almost indistinguishable. The quotes beneath each adapted principle distilled from the INTERFET detention operations
are taken from the Australian Minister for Defence's December 14,2010 detainee
management arrangements statement and his March 23, 201 1 Detainee Arrangements Briefing Paper, and serve to illustrate the virtually unchanged nature of
detentions between INTERFET and Afghanistan:
1. Ensuring a process that allows for quick initial removal from the battlespace of people posing security/stability risks.
"The first priority is the critical need to remove insurgents from the battlefield, where they endanger Australian, International Security Assistance Force and Afghan lives."56
2. Ensuring protection of the relevant h uman rights for detainees.
"The second priority is the need to ensure humane treatment of detainees, consistent with Australian values and our legal obligations."57
3. Using local criminal or security law as the reason/basis for detention, both
as a recognition of the primary sovereignty at play within the territOI)' and as
a means of developing and promoting capacity within that sovereignty.
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"Once initial screening is complete, detainees are transferred either to
Afghan or United States custody, or released if there is insufficient evidence to justify ongoing detention."58
4. Using elements ofLOAC, on a policy basis as opposed to de jure, to inform
detention operations.
In comparing detention operations across NIAC and less-than-NIAC
contexts, I believe that this "principle" provides the most interesting and
sensitive measurement as to the degree to which the two regimes for detention are now almost indistinguishable. As the Minister for Defence
observed, "[ tlhe detainee management framework draws on applicable
international standards and advice from international organizations. It is
consistent with [that is, not based on] the Laws of Armed Confli ct and the
Geneva Conventions."59
As will be evident, NLAC LOAC was

described as the governing law
for NLAC detention operations, but rather as simply an infonning paradigm. Furthermore, I would hazard to argue that this is not merely an
Australian development-UK cases (in the UK Court of Appeal and
House of Lords/UK Supreme Court, and before the European Court of
Human Rights), such asAIJedda,60 AI-Skeinj61 and Maya Evans,62 also indicate this trend toward assessing detention operations in NIAC through
a law enforcement and human rights-governed prism, as opposed to as a
primarily LOAC-governed issue.
110t

5. Having in place systems of guarantees for fundamental human rights as
to treatment and legal processes post-handover into the developing
Afghan criminal justice system.
As the Minister for Defence stated: "A detainee monitoring team of Aus-

tralian officials monitors detainees' welfare and conditions while they are
in US or Afghan custody, until they are released or sentenced. The monitoring team visit detainees shortly after transfer and around every four
weeks after the initial visits."63
This makes dear the scope of and arrangements for this post-handover
monitoring are not merely presentational, but are designed to be effective
and remedial: "This monitoring is underpinned by formal arrangements
with Afghanistan and the US, which include assurances on the humane
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treatment of detainees and free access by Australian officials and hwnan
rights organisations."64
Indeed, this deep concern with post-handover monitoring, even where the
handover has been to proper representatives of the territorial sovereignty-a fundamentally human rights-based as opposed to LOAC-based concern-is reflected
in the recognition, but general dismissal, of the logistical difficulties involved in
"the current requirement for an initial detainee monitoring visit to occur within 72
hours after a detainee is transferred from the Australian Initial Screening Area to
US or Afghan custody."65 A policy decision to retain this requirement, because it is
practically important, regardless of the significant logistical problems it can pose, is
indicative of this concern.
It thus seems reasonably safe to assert, I would argue, that the fundamental
principles governing detention operations in East Timor and Afghanistan-one a
less-than -NIAC context and the other dearly a NIAC LOAC-governed contextare hardly distinguishable. From a purist legal perspective, this may be sound or
unsound, laudable or regrettable. But that is not the point. The practical point is
that this is how operational practice is evolving, and that-in line with the humanize and harmonize agenda which is seeing NlAC squeezed between colonizing tendencies from below (human rights) and above (lAC LOAC)-there has been little
objection to this evolution. Indeed, apart from the detailed requirements of prisoner of war status, processes and regulation that apply in lAC, it is fast becoming
arguable that detention operations in armed conflict have now been almost completely colonized by the h uman rights paradigm and law enforcement sensibilities.
Conclusion
The Australian experience, believe, dearly illustrates that in potential NlAC
contexts, conflict characterization decisions-from which almost all other subordinate operational legal issues will take their lead-are subject to a mixed legal!
policy approach. And from this initial stepping-off point, core subsidiary operations law decisions, such as characterization ofthe adversary, and ROE, will take
their divergent leads. I accept that this is a potentially contentious conclusion for
LOAC purists who will insist that characterization decisions are only about "the
facts on the ground." The rationale for the purist view is well expressed in Pictet's
most h umanitarian explanation of this seemingly clear and simple principle: "A
wounded soldier is not more deserving, or less deserving. of medical treatment
according to whether his Government does, or does not, recognize the existence
of a state ofwar. "66
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I respectfully disagree that the characterization obligation, when dealing with
the threshold between NIAC and less-than-NlAC conflict contexts, is capable of
being read in such a purist, black letter law manner. The purist admonition to
rely on "facts" has always been a call to an objective test using a narrow range of
fairly self-evident indicators. But the jurisdictional "facts" that inhabit the threshold between NIAC and less-than-NIAC conflict contexts are significantly less objective than in prospective lAC situations, quite apart from lingering legal
uncertainties as to how NlAC relates to lAC or "internationalized internal armed
conflict" occurring in the same battlespace. The "facts" relevant to determining
on which side of the law enforcement/NIAC threshold a situation falls involve assessing highly flexible concepts such as violence, banditry, terrorism and threat.
As Geoffrey Best observes of this conundrum for the negotiators of the Geneva
Conventions, "[ tlhey had known what an international war was, but how were
they to know a non-international armed conflict when they saw one? How were
they to tell it from mob violence, riots, and banditry? ... These were not silly or
necessarily non-humanitarian questions."67
Genuflection to the objective finality of the "facts" has never been, and still is
not, the full picture in characterization at the less-than-NIAC civil disturbancel
NIAC threshold. I believe that this assessment is readily evidenced in the Australian
experience of East Timor and Afghanistan-two conflict contexts in which the
"Australian approach to NlAC" (to the extent that a distinct approach could be
said to exist) has been played out down very differe nt paths. In both contexts, the
decision as to conflict characterization as NIAC or less-than-NIAC civil disturbance was not only intensely political, but also subject to a high degree of reverberation in that each decision dearly indicates that subordinate issues-such as
whether to make lethal targeting authorizations available to the country's forces or
not---can influence the preliminary conflict characterization decision.
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